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a. |
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|
b. |
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|
c. |
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|
d. |
|
a. Move to -1 because |
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b. Move to 1 because |
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|
c. Move to 1 because |
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|
d. The person is indifferent between the two choices because the end result is the same. |
|
a. Only lose -5 on this last choice. |
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|
b. Only lose -3 on this last choice. |
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|
c. Make 5 in profit. |
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|
d. Break even. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
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|
d. There are no values because the tax has made the firm unprofitable. |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
||
|
c. |
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|
d. |
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a. 9 |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
||
|
c. |
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|
d. Algebraic substitution |
|
a. The partial derivative of |
||
|
b. The partial derivative of |
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|
c. The partial derivative of |
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|
d. The partial derivative of |
|
a. Dynamic optimization |
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|
b. Decision tree |
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|
c. Partial derivative |
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|
d. Second derivative, but only at the margin |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
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|
c. |
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|
d. |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. y = 0 |
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|
b. y = 3 |
||
|
c. y = 5 |
||
|
d. |
|
a. -4 |
||
|
b. 0 |
||
|
c. +4 |
||
|
d. |
|
a. -4 |
||
|
b. 0 |
||
|
c. +4 |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
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|
c. 2 |
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|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. Profits are maximized at all points. |
|
a. 0 |
||
|
b. 1 |
||
|
c. 2 |
||
|
d. 4 |
|
a. 0 |
||
|
b. 1 |
||
|
c. 2 |
||
|
d. 4 |
|
a. 0 |
||
|
b. 3 |
||
|
c. 4.5 |
||
|
d. 9 |
|
a. 0 |
||
|
b. 0.75 |
||
|
c. 1 |
||
|
d. 2 |
|
a. 0 |
||
|
b. 1 |
||
|
c. 1.5 |
||
|
d. 2 |
|
a. 0 |
||
|
b. 1 |
||
|
c. 1.5 |
||
|
d. 2 |
|
a. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to zero, then growth would be zero. |
||
|
b. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 1, growth would be steady. |
||
|
c. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 2, growth would be positive but not sustainable. |
||
|
d. Positive growth is not possible at any carbon dioxide level. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. Hamiltonian |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. The identity matrix |
|
a. $30,000 |
||
|
b. $31,000 |
||
|
c. $32,000 |
||
|
d. $33,000 |
|
a. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. |
||
|
b. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. |
||
|
c. The annuity is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. |
||
|
d. The annuity is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. |
|
a. More than $3,000 |
||
|
b. $3,000 |
||
|
c. Less than $3,000 |
||
|
d. Exactly $ |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. Random number operator |
||
|
b. Dynamic optimization |
||
|
c. Expectations operator |
||
|
d. Recursive optimization |
|
a. The market could be pricing in a greater likelihood of a possible default by Bank B, ceteris paribus. |
||
|
b. Bank A |
||
|
c. Bank B may need to attract more capital than Bank A, ceteris paribus. |
||
|
d. All of the above. |
|
a. $50,000 |
||
|
b. $52,000 |
||
|
c. $54,000 |
||
|
d. $56,000 |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $18,000 |
||
|
c. $19,000 |
||
|
d. $20,000 |
|
a. $57,777 |
||
|
b. $58,821 |
||
|
c. $59,121 |
||
|
d. $59,421 |
|
a. $48,912 |
||
|
b. $54,636 |
||
|
c. $56,275 |
||
|
d. $56,666 |
|
a. $9,924 |
||
|
b. $10,204 |
||
|
c. $10,404 |
||
|
d. $10,824 |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $25,000 |
||
|
c. $30,000 |
||
|
d. 15% |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $500,000 |
||
|
c. $1,000,000 |
||
|
d. $5,000,000 |
|
a. Raise your bid to $10,025,000. |
||
|
b. Raise your bid to between $10,000,000 and $10,025,000. |
||
|
c. Raise your bid above $10,025,000. |
||
|
d. Lower your bid to $9,975,000. |
|
a. Place the bid, knowing that there is only a 10 percent chance you will get the job anyway. |
||
|
b. Wait and see how many others have placed bids to see if the probability of winning has changed. |
||
|
c. Place a bid, but only if you are a risk lover. |
||
|
d. Do not place a bid in this auction. |
|
a. Buy the debenture because the expected return is at least $700. |
||
|
b. Buy the debenture because the expected return is greater than $0. |
||
|
c. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is effectively $0. |
||
|
d. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is negative. |
|
a. $10,000 |
||
|
b. $10,270 |
||
|
c. $10,300 |
||
|
d. $9,270 |
|
a. 1.5 percent |
||
|
b. 3 percent |
||
|
c. 4 percent |
||
|
d. 5.5 percent |
|
a. The expected inflation rate, the expected price of college tuition, and the government riskless rate of return |
||
|
b. The expected inflation rate and the government riskless rate of return |
||
|
c. The expected inflation rate and the expected price of college tuition |
||
|
d. The expected price of college tuition. |
|
a. When r = i |
||
|
b. When r < i |
||
|
c. When r > i |
||
|
d. When r = i = 0. |
|
a. Common log |
||
|
b. Natural log |
||
|
c. Binary log |
||
|
d. Cobb-Douglas log |
|
a. Derivative with respect to time |
||
|
b. Partial derivative with respect to rates |
||
|
c. Derivative with respect to rates |
||
|
d. Partial derivative holding the riskless rate constant. |
|
a. When s = 5. |
||
|
b. When 0 < s < 5. |
||
|
c. When 0 = s = 5. |
||
|
d. When s = 5. |
|
a. $281,104 |
||
|
b. $281,704 |
||
|
c. $281,709 |
||
|
d. $282,704 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. (20, 40) |
||
|
b. (2, 36) |
||
|
c. (7, 26) |
||
|
d. (9, 24) |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. 2 |
||
|
d. -2 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. 18 |
||
|
b. 28 |
||
|
c. 38 |
||
|
d. 48 |
|
a. Ratio |
||
|
b. Partial differentiation |
||
|
c. Implicit differentiation |
||
|
d. All of the above. |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. +$9,000*sp |
||
|
c. -$9,000*op |
||
|
d. The answer cannot be determined by the information given. |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. 0.005w |
||
|
c. 0.05w |
||
|
d. 0.10w |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. 0.06w |
||
|
c. 0.12w |
||
|
d. 0.18w |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $1 |
||
|
c. $2.50 |
||
|
d. The information cannot be determined by the information given. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. 2 hours more |
||
|
d. 2 hours less |
|
a. Any utility function |
||
|
b. A marginal rate of substitution |
||
|
c. A budget line. |
||
|
d. Only a Cobb-Douglas utility function |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. 2 |
||
|
d. -2 |
|
a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. |
||
|
b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. |
||
|
c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. |
||
|
d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. |
|
a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. |
||
|
b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. |
||
|
c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. |
||
|
d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. |
|
a. The relatively high payoff for cooperation |
||
|
b. The lack of a payoff in a nondominant mixed solution |
||
|
c. The degree of trust between the players driving the underlying probabilities |
||
|
d. Parity in the take-take outcome |
|
a. p = 0 and q = 1 |
||
|
b. p = 1 and q = 0 |
||
|
c. p = 0 and q = 0 |
||
|
d. p = 0.5 and q = 0.5 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. There is no pure/mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. |
|
a. They divide up the seven things equally. |
||
|
b. They divide up the seven things unequally. |
||
|
c. They both get nothing. |
||
|
d. There is an ultimate winner receiving all seven things. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. Expected value operator, partial derivative, Gantt chart |
||
|
b. Expected value operator, double derivative, decision tree |
||
|
c. Expected value operator, partial derivative, decision tree |
||
|
d. First derivative, second derivative, partial derivative |
|
a. $4 million |
||
|
b. $5 million |
||
|
c. $9 million |
||
|
d. The answer cannot be determined because we need to know the second highest bid. |
|
a. $2 million |
||
|
b. $4 million |
||
|
c. $9 million |
||
|
d. There is no curse. |
|
a. $9 million |
||
|
b. $10 million |
||
|
c. $11 million |
||
|
d. $30 million |
|
a. $15 million |
||
|
b. $18 million |
||
|
c. $28 million |
||
|
d. There is no realized market value to the person selling. |
|
a. $0 million |
||
|
b. $2 million |
||
|
c. $5 million |
||
|
d. There is no winner's curse at an all-pay sealed bid auction. |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $10,000 |
||
|
c. $100,000 |
||
|
d. $1,000,000 |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $900,000 |
||
|
c. $999,000 |
||
|
d. $1,000,000 |
|
a. $0 |
||
|
b. $10,000 |
||
|
c. $100,000 |
||
|
d. $1,000,000 |
|
a. It will be not Pareto optimal. |
||
|
b. It will not coincide with the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. |
||
|
c. It will not be Pareto optimal as long as it's the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. |
||
|
d. It can be only compared with other outcomes to determine Pareto optimality. |
|
a. 0.5 |
||
|
b. 1 |
||
|
c. 2 |
||
|
d. 3 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. -320 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. Partial derivative |
||
|
b. First derivative |
||
|
c. Second derivative |
||
|
d. Cobb-Douglas utility function |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. Lagrangian |
||
|
b. Eulerian |
||
|
c. Hamiltonian |
||
|
d. Frunze's periphrastic |
|
a. 1 |
||
|
b. 2 |
||
|
c. 3 |
||
|
d. 4 |
|
a. 2 |
||
|
b. 4 |
||
|
c. 6 |
||
|
d. 8 |
|
a. 4 |
||
|
b. 8 |
||
|
c. 16 |
||
|
d. 32 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. 0.5 |
||
|
b. 1 |
||
|
c. 2 |
||
|
d. 3 |
|
a. -300 |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |