a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. Move to -1 because ![]() ![]() |
||
b. Move to 1 because ![]() ![]() |
||
c. Move to 1 because ![]() ![]() |
||
d. The person is indifferent between the two choices because the end result is the same. ![]() |
a. Only lose -5 on this last choice. ![]() |
||
b. Only lose -3 on this last choice. ![]() |
||
c. Make 5 in profit. ![]() |
||
d. Break even. ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. There are no values because the tax has made the firm unprofitable. ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. 9 ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. Algebraic substitution ![]() |
a. The partial derivative of ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
b. The partial derivative of ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. The partial derivative of ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
d. The partial derivative of ![]() ![]() ![]() |
a. Dynamic optimization ![]() |
||
b. Decision tree ![]() |
||
c. Partial derivative ![]() |
||
d. Second derivative, but only at the margin ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. y = 0 ![]() |
||
b. y = 3 ![]() |
||
c. y = 5 ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. -4 ![]() |
||
b. 0 ![]() |
||
c. +4 ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. -4 ![]() |
||
b. 0 ![]() |
||
c. +4 ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
d. Profits are maximized at all points. ![]() |
a. 0 ![]() |
||
b. 1 ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. 4 ![]() |
a. 0 ![]() |
||
b. 1 ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. 4 ![]() |
a. 0 ![]() |
||
b. 3 ![]() |
||
c. 4.5 ![]() |
||
d. 9 ![]() |
a. 0 ![]() |
||
b. 0.75 ![]() |
||
c. 1 ![]() |
||
d. 2 ![]() |
a. 0 ![]() |
||
b. 1 ![]() |
||
c. 1.5 ![]() |
||
d. 2 ![]() |
a. 0 ![]() |
||
b. 1 ![]() |
||
c. 1.5 ![]() |
||
d. 2 ![]() |
a. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to zero, then growth would be zero. ![]() |
||
b. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 1, growth would be steady. ![]() |
||
c. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 2, growth would be positive but not sustainable. ![]() |
||
d. Positive growth is not possible at any carbon dioxide level. ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. Hamiltonian ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. The identity matrix ![]() |
a. $30,000 ![]() |
||
b. $31,000 ![]() |
||
c. $32,000 ![]() |
||
d. $33,000 ![]() |
a. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. ![]() |
||
b. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. ![]() |
||
c. The annuity is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. ![]() |
||
d. The annuity is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. ![]() |
a. More than $3,000 ![]() |
||
b. $3,000 ![]() |
||
c. Less than $3,000 ![]() |
||
d. Exactly $ ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. Random number operator ![]() |
||
b. Dynamic optimization ![]() |
||
c. Expectations operator ![]() |
||
d. Recursive optimization ![]() |
a. The market could be pricing in a greater likelihood of a possible default by Bank B, ceteris paribus. ![]() |
||
b. Bank A ![]() |
||
c. Bank B may need to attract more capital than Bank A, ceteris paribus. ![]() |
||
d. All of the above. ![]() |
a. $50,000 ![]() |
||
b. $52,000 ![]() |
||
c. $54,000 ![]() |
||
d. $56,000 ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $18,000 ![]() |
||
c. $19,000 ![]() |
||
d. $20,000 ![]() |
a. $57,777 ![]() |
||
b. $58,821 ![]() |
||
c. $59,121 ![]() |
||
d. $59,421 ![]() |
a. $48,912 ![]() |
||
b. $54,636 ![]() |
||
c. $56,275 ![]() |
||
d. $56,666 ![]() |
a. $9,924 ![]() |
||
b. $10,204 ![]() |
||
c. $10,404 ![]() |
||
d. $10,824 ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $25,000 ![]() |
||
c. $30,000 ![]() |
||
d. 15% ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $500,000 ![]() |
||
c. $1,000,000 ![]() |
||
d. $5,000,000 ![]() |
a. Raise your bid to $10,025,000. ![]() |
||
b. Raise your bid to between $10,000,000 and $10,025,000. ![]() |
||
c. Raise your bid above $10,025,000. ![]() |
||
d. Lower your bid to $9,975,000. ![]() |
a. Place the bid, knowing that there is only a 10 percent chance you will get the job anyway. ![]() |
||
b. Wait and see how many others have placed bids to see if the probability of winning has changed. ![]() |
||
c. Place a bid, but only if you are a risk lover. ![]() |
||
d. Do not place a bid in this auction. ![]() |
a. Buy the debenture because the expected return is at least $700. ![]() |
||
b. Buy the debenture because the expected return is greater than $0. ![]() |
||
c. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is effectively $0. ![]() |
||
d. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is negative. ![]() |
a. $10,000 ![]() |
||
b. $10,270 ![]() |
||
c. $10,300 ![]() |
||
d. $9,270 ![]() |
a. 1.5 percent ![]() |
||
b. 3 percent ![]() |
||
c. 4 percent ![]() |
||
d. 5.5 percent ![]() |
a. The expected inflation rate, the expected price of college tuition, and the government riskless rate of return ![]() |
||
b. The expected inflation rate and the government riskless rate of return ![]() |
||
c. The expected inflation rate and the expected price of college tuition ![]() |
||
d. The expected price of college tuition. ![]() |
a. When r = i ![]() |
||
b. When r < i ![]() |
||
c. When r > i ![]() |
||
d. When r = i = 0. ![]() |
a. Common log ![]() |
||
b. Natural log ![]() |
||
c. Binary log ![]() |
||
d. Cobb-Douglas log ![]() |
a. Derivative with respect to time ![]() |
||
b. Partial derivative with respect to rates ![]() |
||
c. Derivative with respect to rates ![]() |
||
d. Partial derivative holding the riskless rate constant. ![]() |
a. When s = 5. ![]() |
||
b. When 0 < s < 5. ![]() |
||
c. When 0 = s = 5. ![]() |
||
d. When s = 5. ![]() |
a. $281,104 ![]() |
||
b. $281,704 ![]() |
||
c. $281,709 ![]() |
||
d. $282,704 ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. (20, 40) ![]() |
||
b. (2, 36) ![]() |
||
c. (7, 26) ![]() |
||
d. (9, 24) ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. -2 ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. 18 ![]() |
||
b. 28 ![]() |
||
c. 38 ![]() |
||
d. 48 ![]() |
a. Ratio ![]() |
||
b. Partial differentiation ![]() |
||
c. Implicit differentiation ![]() |
||
d. All of the above. ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. +$9,000*sp ![]() |
||
c. -$9,000*op ![]() |
||
d. The answer cannot be determined by the information given. ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. 0.005w ![]() |
||
c. 0.05w ![]() |
||
d. 0.10w ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. 0.06w ![]() |
||
c. 0.12w ![]() |
||
d. 0.18w ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $1 ![]() |
||
c. $2.50 ![]() |
||
d. The information cannot be determined by the information given. ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. 2 hours more ![]() |
||
d. 2 hours less ![]() |
a. Any utility function ![]() |
||
b. A marginal rate of substitution ![]() |
||
c. A budget line. ![]() |
||
d. Only a Cobb-Douglas utility function ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. -2 ![]() |
a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. ![]() |
||
b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. ![]() |
||
c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. ![]() |
||
d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. ![]() |
a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. ![]() |
||
b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. ![]() |
||
c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. ![]() |
||
d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. ![]() |
a. The relatively high payoff for cooperation ![]() |
||
b. The lack of a payoff in a nondominant mixed solution ![]() |
||
c. The degree of trust between the players driving the underlying probabilities ![]() |
||
d. Parity in the take-take outcome ![]() |
a. p = 0 and q = 1 ![]() |
||
b. p = 1 and q = 0 ![]() |
||
c. p = 0 and q = 0 ![]() |
||
d. p = 0.5 and q = 0.5 ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
d. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
d. There is no pure/mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. ![]() |
a. They divide up the seven things equally. ![]() |
||
b. They divide up the seven things unequally. ![]() |
||
c. They both get nothing. ![]() |
||
d. There is an ultimate winner receiving all seven things. ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. Expected value operator, partial derivative, Gantt chart ![]() |
||
b. Expected value operator, double derivative, decision tree ![]() |
||
c. Expected value operator, partial derivative, decision tree ![]() |
||
d. First derivative, second derivative, partial derivative ![]() |
a. $4 million ![]() |
||
b. $5 million ![]() |
||
c. $9 million ![]() |
||
d. The answer cannot be determined because we need to know the second highest bid. ![]() |
a. $2 million ![]() |
||
b. $4 million ![]() |
||
c. $9 million ![]() |
||
d. There is no curse. ![]() |
a. $9 million ![]() |
||
b. $10 million ![]() |
||
c. $11 million ![]() |
||
d. $30 million ![]() |
a. $15 million ![]() |
||
b. $18 million ![]() |
||
c. $28 million ![]() |
||
d. There is no realized market value to the person selling. ![]() |
a. $0 million ![]() |
||
b. $2 million ![]() |
||
c. $5 million ![]() |
||
d. There is no winner's curse at an all-pay sealed bid auction. ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $10,000 ![]() |
||
c. $100,000 ![]() |
||
d. $1,000,000 ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $900,000 ![]() |
||
c. $999,000 ![]() |
||
d. $1,000,000 ![]() |
a. $0 ![]() |
||
b. $10,000 ![]() |
||
c. $100,000 ![]() |
||
d. $1,000,000 ![]() |
a. It will be not Pareto optimal. ![]() |
||
b. It will not coincide with the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. ![]() |
||
c. It will not be Pareto optimal as long as it's the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. ![]() |
||
d. It can be only compared with other outcomes to determine Pareto optimality. ![]() |
a. 0.5 ![]() |
||
b. 1 ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. 3 ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. -320 ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. Partial derivative ![]() |
||
b. First derivative ![]() |
||
c. Second derivative ![]() |
||
d. Cobb-Douglas utility function ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. Lagrangian ![]() |
||
b. Eulerian ![]() |
||
c. Hamiltonian ![]() |
||
d. Frunze's periphrastic ![]() |
a. 1 ![]() |
||
b. 2 ![]() |
||
c. 3 ![]() |
||
d. 4 ![]() |
a. 2 ![]() |
||
b. 4 ![]() |
||
c. 6 ![]() |
||
d. 8 ![]() |
a. 4 ![]() |
||
b. 8 ![]() |
||
c. 16 ![]() |
||
d. 32 ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |
a. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
a. 0.5 ![]() |
||
b. 1 ![]() |
||
c. 2 ![]() |
||
d. 3 ![]() |
a. -300 ![]() |
||
b. ![]() ![]() |
||
c. ![]() ![]() |
||
d. ![]() ![]() |