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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. Move to -1 because |
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b. Move to 1 because |
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c. Move to 1 because |
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| d. The person is indifferent between the two choices because the end result is the same. |
| a. Only lose -5 on this last choice. | ||
| b. Only lose -3 on this last choice. | ||
| c. Make 5 in profit. | ||
| d. Break even. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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| d. There are no values because the tax has made the firm unprofitable. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
| a. 9 | ||
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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| d. Algebraic substitution |
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a. The partial derivative of |
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b. The partial derivative of |
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c. The partial derivative of |
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d. The partial derivative of |
| a. Dynamic optimization | ||
| b. Decision tree | ||
| c. Partial derivative | ||
| d. Second derivative, but only at the margin |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
| a. y = 0 | ||
| b. y = 3 | ||
| c. y = 5 | ||
|
d. |
| a. -4 | ||
| b. 0 | ||
| c. +4 | ||
|
d. |
| a. -4 | ||
| b. 0 | ||
| c. +4 | ||
|
d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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| c. 2 | ||
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d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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| d. Profits are maximized at all points. |
| a. 0 | ||
| b. 1 | ||
| c. 2 | ||
| d. 4 |
| a. 0 | ||
| b. 1 | ||
| c. 2 | ||
| d. 4 |
| a. 0 | ||
| b. 3 | ||
| c. 4.5 | ||
| d. 9 |
| a. 0 | ||
| b. 0.75 | ||
| c. 1 | ||
| d. 2 |
| a. 0 | ||
| b. 1 | ||
| c. 1.5 | ||
| d. 2 |
| a. 0 | ||
| b. 1 | ||
| c. 1.5 | ||
| d. 2 |
| a. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to zero, then growth would be zero. | ||
| b. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 1, growth would be steady. | ||
| c. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 2, growth would be positive but not sustainable. | ||
| d. Positive growth is not possible at any carbon dioxide level. |
|
a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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| d. Hamiltonian |
|
a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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| d. The identity matrix |
| a. $30,000 | ||
| b. $31,000 | ||
| c. $32,000 | ||
| d. $33,000 |
| a. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. | ||
| b. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. | ||
| c. The annuity is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. | ||
| d. The annuity is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. |
| a. More than $3,000 | ||
| b. $3,000 | ||
| c. Less than $3,000 | ||
|
d. Exactly $ |
|
a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
| a. Random number operator | ||
| b. Dynamic optimization | ||
| c. Expectations operator | ||
| d. Recursive optimization |
| a. The market could be pricing in a greater likelihood of a possible default by Bank B, ceteris paribus. | ||
| b. Bank A | ||
| c. Bank B may need to attract more capital than Bank A, ceteris paribus. | ||
| d. All of the above. |
| a. $50,000 | ||
| b. $52,000 | ||
| c. $54,000 | ||
| d. $56,000 |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $18,000 | ||
| c. $19,000 | ||
| d. $20,000 |
| a. $57,777 | ||
| b. $58,821 | ||
| c. $59,121 | ||
| d. $59,421 |
| a. $48,912 | ||
| b. $54,636 | ||
| c. $56,275 | ||
| d. $56,666 |
| a. $9,924 | ||
| b. $10,204 | ||
| c. $10,404 | ||
| d. $10,824 |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $25,000 | ||
| c. $30,000 | ||
| d. 15% |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $500,000 | ||
| c. $1,000,000 | ||
| d. $5,000,000 |
| a. Raise your bid to $10,025,000. | ||
| b. Raise your bid to between $10,000,000 and $10,025,000. | ||
| c. Raise your bid above $10,025,000. | ||
| d. Lower your bid to $9,975,000. |
| a. Place the bid, knowing that there is only a 10 percent chance you will get the job anyway. | ||
| b. Wait and see how many others have placed bids to see if the probability of winning has changed. | ||
| c. Place a bid, but only if you are a risk lover. | ||
| d. Do not place a bid in this auction. |
| a. Buy the debenture because the expected return is at least $700. | ||
| b. Buy the debenture because the expected return is greater than $0. | ||
| c. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is effectively $0. | ||
| d. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is negative. |
| a. $10,000 | ||
| b. $10,270 | ||
| c. $10,300 | ||
| d. $9,270 |
| a. 1.5 percent | ||
| b. 3 percent | ||
| c. 4 percent | ||
| d. 5.5 percent |
| a. The expected inflation rate, the expected price of college tuition, and the government riskless rate of return | ||
| b. The expected inflation rate and the government riskless rate of return | ||
| c. The expected inflation rate and the expected price of college tuition | ||
| d. The expected price of college tuition. |
| a. When r = i | ||
| b. When r < i | ||
| c. When r > i | ||
| d. When r = i = 0. |
| a. Common log | ||
| b. Natural log | ||
| c. Binary log | ||
| d. Cobb-Douglas log |
| a. Derivative with respect to time | ||
| b. Partial derivative with respect to rates | ||
| c. Derivative with respect to rates | ||
| d. Partial derivative holding the riskless rate constant. |
| a. When s = 5. | ||
| b. When 0 < s < 5. | ||
| c. When 0 = s = 5. | ||
| d. When s = 5. |
| a. $281,104 | ||
| b. $281,704 | ||
| c. $281,709 | ||
| d. $282,704 |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
| a. (20, 40) | ||
| b. (2, 36) | ||
| c. (7, 26) | ||
| d. (9, 24) |
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a. |
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b. |
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| c. 2 | ||
| d. -2 |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
| a. 18 | ||
| b. 28 | ||
| c. 38 | ||
| d. 48 |
| a. Ratio | ||
| b. Partial differentiation | ||
| c. Implicit differentiation | ||
| d. All of the above. |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. +$9,000*sp | ||
| c. -$9,000*op | ||
| d. The answer cannot be determined by the information given. |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. 0.005w | ||
| c. 0.05w | ||
| d. 0.10w |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. 0.06w | ||
| c. 0.12w | ||
| d. 0.18w |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $1 | ||
| c. $2.50 | ||
| d. The information cannot be determined by the information given. |
|
a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
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a. |
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|
b. |
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| c. 2 hours more | ||
| d. 2 hours less |
| a. Any utility function | ||
| b. A marginal rate of substitution | ||
| c. A budget line. | ||
| d. Only a Cobb-Douglas utility function |
|
a. |
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b. |
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c. |
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d. |
|
a. |
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b. |
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| c. 2 | ||
| d. -2 |
| a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. | ||
| b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. | ||
| c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. | ||
| d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. |
| a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. | ||
| b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. | ||
| c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. | ||
| d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. |
| a. The relatively high payoff for cooperation | ||
| b. The lack of a payoff in a nondominant mixed solution | ||
| c. The degree of trust between the players driving the underlying probabilities | ||
| d. Parity in the take-take outcome |
| a. p = 0 and q = 1 | ||
| b. p = 1 and q = 0 | ||
| c. p = 0 and q = 0 | ||
| d. p = 0.5 and q = 0.5 |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
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|
c. |
||
| d. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
| d. There is no pure/mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. |
| a. They divide up the seven things equally. | ||
| b. They divide up the seven things unequally. | ||
| c. They both get nothing. | ||
| d. There is an ultimate winner receiving all seven things. |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
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|
c. |
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|
d. |
|
a. |
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|
b. |
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|
c. |
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|
d. |
| a. Expected value operator, partial derivative, Gantt chart | ||
| b. Expected value operator, double derivative, decision tree | ||
| c. Expected value operator, partial derivative, decision tree | ||
| d. First derivative, second derivative, partial derivative |
| a. $4 million | ||
| b. $5 million | ||
| c. $9 million | ||
| d. The answer cannot be determined because we need to know the second highest bid. |
| a. $2 million | ||
| b. $4 million | ||
| c. $9 million | ||
| d. There is no curse. |
| a. $9 million | ||
| b. $10 million | ||
| c. $11 million | ||
| d. $30 million |
| a. $15 million | ||
| b. $18 million | ||
| c. $28 million | ||
| d. There is no realized market value to the person selling. |
| a. $0 million | ||
| b. $2 million | ||
| c. $5 million | ||
| d. There is no winner's curse at an all-pay sealed bid auction. |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $10,000 | ||
| c. $100,000 | ||
| d. $1,000,000 |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $900,000 | ||
| c. $999,000 | ||
| d. $1,000,000 |
| a. $0 | ||
| b. $10,000 | ||
| c. $100,000 | ||
| d. $1,000,000 |
| a. It will be not Pareto optimal. | ||
| b. It will not coincide with the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. | ||
| c. It will not be Pareto optimal as long as it's the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. | ||
| d. It can be only compared with other outcomes to determine Pareto optimality. |
| a. 0.5 | ||
| b. 1 | ||
| c. 2 | ||
| d. 3 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
| d. -320 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
| a. Partial derivative | ||
| b. First derivative | ||
| c. Second derivative | ||
| d. Cobb-Douglas utility function |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
| a. Lagrangian | ||
| b. Eulerian | ||
| c. Hamiltonian | ||
| d. Frunze's periphrastic |
| a. 1 | ||
| b. 2 | ||
| c. 3 | ||
| d. 4 |
| a. 2 | ||
| b. 4 | ||
| c. 6 | ||
| d. 8 |
| a. 4 | ||
| b. 8 | ||
| c. 16 | ||
| d. 32 |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
|
a. |
||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |
| a. 0.5 | ||
| b. 1 | ||
| c. 2 | ||
| d. 3 |
| a. -300 | ||
|
b. |
||
|
c. |
||
|
d. |