a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. Move to -1 because . | ||
b. Move to 1 because . | ||
c. Move to 1 because . | ||
d. The person is indifferent between the two choices because the end result is the same. |
a. Only lose -5 on this last choice. | ||
b. Only lose -3 on this last choice. | ||
c. Make 5 in profit. | ||
d. Break even. |
a. | ||
b. only | ||
c. | ||
d. There are no values because the tax has made the firm unprofitable. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. 9 | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. only | ||
b. and | ||
c. | ||
d. Algebraic substitution |
a. The partial derivative of , holding constant. | ||
b. The partial derivative of , holding constant. | ||
c. The partial derivative of , holding constant. | ||
d. The partial derivative of , holding constant. |
a. Dynamic optimization | ||
b. Decision tree | ||
c. Partial derivative | ||
d. Second derivative, but only at the margin |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. y = 0 | ||
b. y = 3 | ||
c. y = 5 | ||
d. |
a. -4 | ||
b. 0 | ||
c. +4 | ||
d. |
a. -4 | ||
b. 0 | ||
c. +4 | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. |
a. because there are zero normal profits. | ||
b. because at that point and . | ||
c. and because at both points, at that point and . | ||
d. Profits are maximized at all points. |
a. 0 | ||
b. 1 | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. 4 |
a. 0 | ||
b. 1 | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. 4 |
a. 0 | ||
b. 3 | ||
c. 4.5 | ||
d. 9 |
a. 0 | ||
b. 0.75 | ||
c. 1 | ||
d. 2 |
a. 0 | ||
b. 1 | ||
c. 1.5 | ||
d. 2 |
a. 0 | ||
b. 1 | ||
c. 1.5 | ||
d. 2 |
a. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to zero, then growth would be zero. | ||
b. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 1, growth would be steady. | ||
c. If the country set carbon dioxide levels to 2, growth would be positive but not sustainable. | ||
d. Positive growth is not possible at any carbon dioxide level. |
a. only | ||
b. and | ||
c. | ||
d. Hamiltonian |
a. only | ||
b. and | ||
c. | ||
d. The identity matrix |
a. $30,000 | ||
b. $31,000 | ||
c. $32,000 | ||
d. $33,000 |
a. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. | ||
b. The lump sum payment is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. | ||
c. The annuity is a better deal, but by less than €1,000. | ||
d. The annuity is a better deal, but by more than €1,000. |
a. More than $3,000 | ||
b. $3,000 | ||
c. Less than $3,000 | ||
d. Exactly $ |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. Random number operator | ||
b. Dynamic optimization | ||
c. Expectations operator | ||
d. Recursive optimization |
a. The market could be pricing in a greater likelihood of a possible default by Bank B, ceteris paribus. | ||
b. Bank A | ||
c. Bank B may need to attract more capital than Bank A, ceteris paribus. | ||
d. All of the above. |
a. $50,000 | ||
b. $52,000 | ||
c. $54,000 | ||
d. $56,000 |
a. $0 | ||
b. $18,000 | ||
c. $19,000 | ||
d. $20,000 |
a. $57,777 | ||
b. $58,821 | ||
c. $59,121 | ||
d. $59,421 |
a. $48,912 | ||
b. $54,636 | ||
c. $56,275 | ||
d. $56,666 |
a. $9,924 | ||
b. $10,204 | ||
c. $10,404 | ||
d. $10,824 |
a. $0 | ||
b. $25,000 | ||
c. $30,000 | ||
d. 15% |
a. $0 | ||
b. $500,000 | ||
c. $1,000,000 | ||
d. $5,000,000 |
a. Raise your bid to $10,025,000. | ||
b. Raise your bid to between $10,000,000 and $10,025,000. | ||
c. Raise your bid above $10,025,000. | ||
d. Lower your bid to $9,975,000. |
a. Place the bid, knowing that there is only a 10 percent chance you will get the job anyway. | ||
b. Wait and see how many others have placed bids to see if the probability of winning has changed. | ||
c. Place a bid, but only if you are a risk lover. | ||
d. Do not place a bid in this auction. |
a. Buy the debenture because the expected return is at least $700. | ||
b. Buy the debenture because the expected return is greater than $0. | ||
c. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is effectively $0. | ||
d. Don't buy the debenture because the expected return is negative. |
a. $10,000 | ||
b. $10,270 | ||
c. $10,300 | ||
d. $9,270 |
a. 1.5 percent | ||
b. 3 percent | ||
c. 4 percent | ||
d. 5.5 percent |
a. The expected inflation rate, the expected price of college tuition, and the government riskless rate of return | ||
b. The expected inflation rate and the government riskless rate of return | ||
c. The expected inflation rate and the expected price of college tuition | ||
d. The expected price of college tuition. |
a. When r = i | ||
b. When r < i | ||
c. When r > i | ||
d. When r = i = 0. |
a. Common log | ||
b. Natural log | ||
c. Binary log | ||
d. Cobb-Douglas log |
a. Derivative with respect to time | ||
b. Partial derivative with respect to rates | ||
c. Derivative with respect to rates | ||
d. Partial derivative holding the riskless rate constant. |
a. When s = 5. | ||
b. When 0 < s < 5. | ||
c. When 0 = s = 5. | ||
d. When s = 5. |
a. $281,104 | ||
b. $281,704 | ||
c. $281,709 | ||
d. $282,704 |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. (20, 40) | ||
b. (2, 36) | ||
c. (7, 26) | ||
d. (9, 24) |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. -2 |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. 18 | ||
b. 28 | ||
c. 38 | ||
d. 48 |
a. Ratio | ||
b. Partial differentiation | ||
c. Implicit differentiation | ||
d. All of the above. |
a. $0 | ||
b. +$9,000*sp | ||
c. -$9,000*op | ||
d. The answer cannot be determined by the information given. |
a. $0 | ||
b. 0.005w | ||
c. 0.05w | ||
d. 0.10w |
a. $0 | ||
b. 0.06w | ||
c. 0.12w | ||
d. 0.18w |
a. $0 | ||
b. $1 | ||
c. $2.50 | ||
d. The information cannot be determined by the information given. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. hour more | ||
b. hour less | ||
c. 2 hours more | ||
d. 2 hours less |
a. Any utility function | ||
b. A marginal rate of substitution | ||
c. A budget line. | ||
d. Only a Cobb-Douglas utility function |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. -2 |
a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. | ||
b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. | ||
c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. | ||
d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. |
a. Player 1 takes and Player 2 takes. | ||
b. Player 1 takes and Player 2 shares. | ||
c. Player 1 shares and Player 2 takes. | ||
d. Player 1 shares and Player 2 shares. |
a. The relatively high payoff for cooperation | ||
b. The lack of a payoff in a nondominant mixed solution | ||
c. The degree of trust between the players driving the underlying probabilities | ||
d. Parity in the take-take outcome |
a. p = 0 and q = 1 | ||
b. p = 1 and q = 0 | ||
c. p = 0 and q = 0 | ||
d. p = 0.5 and q = 0.5 |
a. & | ||
b. & | ||
c. & | ||
d. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. |
a. & | ||
b. & | ||
c. & | ||
d. There is no pure/mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. |
a. They divide up the seven things equally. | ||
b. They divide up the seven things unequally. | ||
c. They both get nothing. | ||
d. There is an ultimate winner receiving all seven things. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. Expected value operator, partial derivative, Gantt chart | ||
b. Expected value operator, double derivative, decision tree | ||
c. Expected value operator, partial derivative, decision tree | ||
d. First derivative, second derivative, partial derivative |
a. $4 million | ||
b. $5 million | ||
c. $9 million | ||
d. The answer cannot be determined because we need to know the second highest bid. |
a. $2 million | ||
b. $4 million | ||
c. $9 million | ||
d. There is no curse. |
a. $9 million | ||
b. $10 million | ||
c. $11 million | ||
d. $30 million |
a. $15 million | ||
b. $18 million | ||
c. $28 million | ||
d. There is no realized market value to the person selling. |
a. $0 million | ||
b. $2 million | ||
c. $5 million | ||
d. There is no winner's curse at an all-pay sealed bid auction. |
a. $0 | ||
b. $10,000 | ||
c. $100,000 | ||
d. $1,000,000 |
a. $0 | ||
b. $900,000 | ||
c. $999,000 | ||
d. $1,000,000 |
a. $0 | ||
b. $10,000 | ||
c. $100,000 | ||
d. $1,000,000 |
a. It will be not Pareto optimal. | ||
b. It will not coincide with the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. | ||
c. It will not be Pareto optimal as long as it's the same solution as if the game played out from the beginning. | ||
d. It can be only compared with other outcomes to determine Pareto optimality. |
a. 0.5 | ||
b. 1 | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. 3 |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. -320 |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. Partial derivative | ||
b. First derivative | ||
c. Second derivative | ||
d. Cobb-Douglas utility function |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. . | ||
b. . | ||
c. . | ||
d. . |
a. Lagrangian | ||
b. Eulerian | ||
c. Hamiltonian | ||
d. Frunze's periphrastic |
a. 1 | ||
b. 2 | ||
c. 3 | ||
d. 4 |
a. 2 | ||
b. 4 | ||
c. 6 | ||
d. 8 |
a. 4 | ||
b. 8 | ||
c. 16 | ||
d. 32 |
a. | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |
a. and | ||
b. and | ||
c. and | ||
d. and |
a. 0.5 | ||
b. 1 | ||
c. 2 | ||
d. 3 |
a. -300 | ||
b. | ||
c. | ||
d. |