a. We lack methods for deriving observable consequences from ethical propositions. | ||
b. The study of ethics is properly a matter for religion rather than science. | ||
c. The study of ethics is not important. | ||
d. There is insufficient motivation, such as research grants, for the study of ethics. |
a. we should not dispute propositions using reason. | ||
b. we should not dispute propositions unless they can be shown by precise logic and/or mathematics to have observable consequences. | ||
c. we should not trust a method that, throughout history, has repeatedly shown itself to be unreliable. | ||
d. we should always accept the simplest propositions. |
a. correct. | ||
b. justified. | ||
c. ethical. | ||
d. efficient. |
a. How do scientists interact as social groups to resolve differences of opinion? | ||
b. What thought processes do scientists follow when judging the merits of competing opinions? | ||
c. How have scientists' interactions and styles of reasoning changed over the centuries? | ||
d. What methods do scientists use to acquire knowledge? |
a. How do scientists engage in research? | ||
b. How do scientists come up with new theories or experimental procedures? | ||
c. How have particular theories or experimental procedures come to be accepted by individual scientists and the scientific community as a whole? | ||
d. How should we interpret the pronouncements scientists make about their research findings? |
a. What is the nature of confirmation? | ||
b. What is the nature of explanation? | ||
c. What is the nature of gravity? | ||
d. What is the nature of induction? |
a. we sometimes see the same marks in different ways. | ||
b. we sometimes make the same observations but use those observations in different ways. | ||
c. people with different training see the same marks in different ways. | ||
d. it is unnatural to say that one is halfway through interpreting marks on a page. |
a. observations that are not neutral with respect to competing theories cannot objectively guide a choice between those theories. | ||
b. scientists with competing theories inhabit different worlds. | ||
c. theory-ladenness allows scientists to observe whatever evidence is needed to confirm their own theories and refute rival theories. | ||
d. whether a theory-laden observation confirms or disconfirms a theory depends entirely upon whether scientists agree that the observation does so. |
a. observational evidence is biased toward some theories over others. | ||
b. observers can observe anything they want to observe by adopting different theories. | ||
c. the world of experience is a product of mental activity. | ||
d. observers sometimes observe what they want to observe. |
a. Statements accepted as scientific knowledge are accepted on the basis of observations that are not theory-laden. | ||
b. Statements accepted as scientific knowledge are accepted on the basis of widespread intersubjective consensus among scientists. | ||
c. Statements accepted as scientific knowledge are true independently of whether people believe them to be true. | ||
d. Statements accepted as scientific knowledge are accepted on the basis of independent and impartial criteria. |
a. Novel phenomena can be recognized even when they are not predicted or anticipated by accepted theories. | ||
b. An observation that is theory-laden with respect to one set of theories need not be theory-laden with respect to all theories. | ||
c. There is no theory-neutral language in which scientists can state observation sentences. | ||
d. Scientists who accept different theories literally observe different worlds. |
a. After Galileo drew Saturn as a large planet with a moon on each side, for the next 50 years those who drew pictures of their telescopic observations of Saturn typically drew Saturn with moons coming out of the poles. | ||
b. After Blondlot published a paper claiming to have discovered N-rays, over 300 papers by 100 different scientists were published on the properties of N-rays. | ||
c. During a routine investigation of cathode rays, Roentgen noticed that a barium platino-cyanide screen at some distance from his shielded apparatus glowed when the discharge of cathode rays was in progress. | ||
d. After examining several photographs of Pluto and noticing similar fuzzy regions on each picture, and then consulting older photographs of Pluto and paying attention to previously overlooked fuzzy regions in them, James Christy provided a precise calculation of Charon's orbit around Pluto. |
a. Previous exposure to an unambiguous picture of an old woman or a young woman has drastic effects on the perception of an ambiguous picture of a woman. | ||
b. Some perceptual illusions, such as the Muller-Lyre figure, remain even when we know that they are illusions. | ||
c. Compared to people who hypothesize that objects fall at the same rate regardless of their weight, people who hypothesize that heavier balls fall faster than light ones are more likely to report that heavier balls fall faster than light ones. | ||
d. Showing people a series of pictures from a conceptual class (e.g., animals) causes dramatic shifts in how participants perceive ambiguous man/rat figures. |
a. A change of skin color | ||
b. The taste of a substance | ||
c. The clicking of an amplifier connected to a Geiger counter | ||
d. The coincidence of an instrument pointer with a number on a marked dial |
a. Accepting the data | ||
b. Holding the data in abeyance | ||
c. Ignoring the data | ||
d. Reinterpreting the data |
a. perceptions, sensations, and other phenomena of immediate experience. | ||
b. objects of perception. | ||
c. directly observable and intersubjectively ascertainable facts about physical objects. | ||
d. the way observers interpret their immediate experiences. |
a. the evidence provides a small amount of confirmation for the hypothesis. | ||
b. the evidence provides a large amount of confirmation for the hypothesis. | ||
c. the evidence provides no confirmation for the hypothesis. | ||
d. the evidence disconfirms the hypothesis. |
a. the evidence provides a small amount of confirmation for the hypothesis. | ||
b. the evidence provides a large amount of confirmation for the hypothesis. | ||
c. the evidence provides no confirmation for the hypothesis. | ||
d. the evidence disconfirms the hypothesis. |
a. When there is a good inductive inference from the evidence to the hypothesis | ||
b. When the evidence is the outcome of a severe test and the hypothesis passes the test | ||
c. When the evidence is the outcome of a crucial experiment and the experiment does not falsify the hypothesis | ||
d. When the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence is greater than the prior probability of the hypothesis |
a. the natural laws that govern some phenomenon. | ||
b. the causal history that led to some phenomenon. | ||
c. connections between phenomena. | ||
d. the entities and activities that produce some phenomenon. |
a. When there is a good inductive inference from the evidence to the hypothesis | ||
b. When the evidence is the outcome of a severe test and the hypothesis passes the test | ||
c. When the evidence is the outcome of a crucial experiment and the experiment does not falsify the hypothesis | ||
d. When the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence is greater than the prior probability of the hypothesis |
a. the natural laws that govern some phenomenon. | ||
b. the causal history that led to some phenomenon. | ||
c. connections between phenomena. | ||
d. the entities and activities that produce some phenomenon. |
a. the natural laws that govern some phenomenon. | ||
b. the causal history that led to some phenomenon. | ||
c. connections between phenomena. | ||
d. the entities and activities that produce some phenomenon. |
a. the natural laws that govern some phenomenon. | ||
b. the causal history that led to some phenomenon. | ||
c. connections between phenomena. | ||
d. the entities and activities that produce some phenomenon. |
a. Causal account | ||
b. Mechanistic account | ||
c. Nomological account | ||
d. Unification account |
a. 1/13 | ||
b. 1/12 | ||
c. 1/4 | ||
d. 1/3 |
a. E falsifies H. | ||
b. E confirms H. | ||
c. E proves H. | ||
d. E neither falsifies, confirms, nor refutes H. |
a. Nomological account | ||
b. Causal account | ||
c. Unification account | ||
d. Pragmatic account |
a. The oysters made you all sick. | ||
b. The beef made you all sick. | ||
c. The salad made you all sick. | ||
d. Some combination of oysters, beef, and salad made you all sick. |
a. The oysters made your parents sick. | ||
b. The beef made your parents sick. | ||
c. The salad made your parents sick. | ||
d. The oysters and beef made your parents sick. |
a. At time t1, Mars is at position x1. | ||
b. At time t1, Mars lies on ellipse b. | ||
c. The position of Mars at time t1 is not the same as the position of Mars at time t2. | ||
d. At time t1, Mars is at a distance d1 from the sun. |
a. Since we cannot prove that the conclusions of inductive inferences are justified, and we cannot prove that they are unjustified, we are free to believe that they are justified. | ||
b. Since induction comes to us as naturally and inevitably as breathing, we are rationally justified in performing inductions. | ||
c. Although the conclusions of inductive inferences cannot be justified deductively, they can be justified inductively. | ||
d. No inductions are justified. |
a. Since we cannot prove that the conclusions of inductive inferences are justified, and we cannot prove that they are unjustified, we are free to believe that they are justified. | ||
b. Since induction comes to us as naturally and inevitably as breathing, we are rationally justified in performing inductions. | ||
c. Although the conclusions of inductive inferences cannot be justified deductively, they can be justified inductively. | ||
d. No inductions are justified. |
a. Nomological account | ||
b. Causal account | ||
c. Unification account | ||
d. Pragmatic account |
a. The mice in the laboratory died after taking the experimental drug; therefore, humans will die if they take the experimental drug. | ||
b. The mice in the laboratory died after taking the experimental drug; therefore, all mice will die if they take the experimental drug. | ||
c. The mice in the laboratory died after taking the experimental drug; mice who received a placebo rather than the experimental drug did not die; therefore, the experimental drug caused the mice in the laboratory to die. | ||
d. The mice in the laboratory died after taking the experimental drug; the guinea pigs in the laboratory also died after taking the experimental drug; therefore, the experimental drug caused the mice in the laboratory to die. |
a. It is possible to use the laws of nature and information about the current position of planets to predict where the planets were in the past, but such an argument does not explain those past locations of the planets. | ||
b. It is possible to use the laws of trigonometry and the law that light travels in a straight line to predict the height of a flagpole by measuring the flagpole's shadow, but the length of the flagpole's shadow does not explain the height of the flagpole. | ||
c. Since the vast majority of smokers (99%) will never contract lung cancer, John's smoking would not explain why John gets lung cancer. | ||
d. Even if it is a law of nature that anyone who takes birth control pills does not get pregnant, John's taking birth control pills does not explain why John does not get pregnant. |
a. No hypothesis can be tested in isolation from auxiliary assumptions. | ||
b. No hypothesis can be tested with observations that are not theory-laden. | ||
c. No hypothesis can be tested by induction. | ||
d. Scientific hypotheses are not testable. |
a. Nature is uniform. | ||
b. For the most part, if a regularity holds in my experience, then it holds in nature more generally. | ||
c. Nature exhibits regularities. | ||
d. For the most part, nature exhibits regularities. |
a. Observing a black raven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. | ||
b. Observing a white raven disconfirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. | ||
c. Observing a white horse confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. | ||
d. Even one million observations of black ravens cannot confirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. |
a. All triangles have three sides. | ||
b. All triangles have four sides. | ||
c. Some triangles are blue. | ||
d. Some triangles have three internal angles. |
a. All oaks are trees. | ||
b. All oak trees in the neighborhood were struck by strong winds. | ||
c. All the oak trees in the neighborhood that were struck by strong winds fell down. | ||
d. Strong winds caused the oak trees in the neighborhood to fall down. |
a. Experience shows that all Fs are Gs; therefore, all Fs are Gs. | ||
b. Experience shows that all Fs are Gs; therefore, all Fs are probably Gs. | ||
c. Experience shows that all Fs are Gs; therefore, being F is a cause of being G. | ||
d. Experience shows that all Fs are Gs; therefore, being G is a cause of being F. |
a. The explanans must contain general laws. | ||
b. The explanans must have empirical content. | ||
c. The explanans must be true. | ||
d. The explanans must be falsifiable. |
a. The explanans must contain general laws. | ||
b. The explanans must be explanatorily relevant. | ||
c. The explanans must be felt to be true. | ||
d. The explanans must be more relevant than its rivals. |
a. Explanation and prediction are not always symmetric. | ||
b. Some explanations use laws of nature to explain other laws of nature. | ||
c. Some explanations explain events that occur with low probability. | ||
d. Some predictions derived using laws of nature contain information that is explanatorily irrelevant. |
a. Astrological predictions are too vague to be capable of refutation. | ||
b. Astrologers do not abandon their theories when confronted with unfavorable evidence. | ||
c. Astrology does not make testable predictions. | ||
d. There is no evidence available to confirm any astrological theory. |
a. It is easy to obtain confirmations for theories. | ||
b. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it. | ||
c. Most theories in the history of science turn out to be false. | ||
d. Upholding a theory after the theory is found to be false diminishes the scientific status of the theory. |
a. If the thesis is true, then no hypothesis is scientific. | ||
b. If the thesis is true, then no hypothesis is objective. | ||
c. If the thesis is true, then no hypothesis can be refuted. | ||
d. If the thesis is true, then every hypothesis is theory-laden. |
a. Bayesianism | ||
b. Bootstrapping | ||
c. Error statistics | ||
d. Falsificationism |
a. Nomological account | ||
b. Causal account | ||
c. Unification account | ||
d. Pragmatic account |
a. When the research programme makes new predictions and has some of those predictions confirmed | ||
b. When the research programme creates new problems for scientists to solve | ||
c. When the research programme solves problems from older research programmes | ||
d. When the research programme helps to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society |
a. When the theory makes new predictions and has some of those predictions confirmed | ||
b. When the theory creates new problems for scientists to solve | ||
c. When the theory solves problems from older scientific theories | ||
d. When the theory helps to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society |
a. the theory is false. | ||
b. either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false. | ||
c. the experimental result is an anomaly. | ||
d. the experiment is a severe test of the theory. |
a. the theory is false. | ||
b. either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false. | ||
c. the experimental result is an anomaly. | ||
d. the experiment is a severe test of the theory. |
a. A collection of scientific hypotheses | ||
b. A central core of hypotheses, less central auxiliary assumptions, and problem-solving machinery | ||
c. A collection of tools and methods for solving problems | ||
d. A collection of aims and objectives, a set of procedures for proper data collection and analysis, and a collection of scientific hypotheses and observations |
a. the theory is false. | ||
b. either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false. | ||
c. the experimental result is an anomaly. | ||
d. the experiment is a severe test of the theory. |
a. Over time, scientists gain more and more proof that their theories are true. | ||
b. Over time, scientists gain more and more confirmation that their theories are true. | ||
c. Over time, scientists continue to propose and test theories that had not been imagined by their predecessors. | ||
d. Over time, more and more people come to learn about scientific theories and the practice of science. |
a. A collection of scientific hypotheses | ||
b. A central core of hypotheses, less central auxiliary assumptions, and problem-solving machinery | ||
c. A collection of tools and methods for solving problems | ||
d. A collection of aims and objectives, a set of procedures for proper data collection and analysis, and a collection of scientific hypotheses and observations |
a. A collection of scientific hypotheses | ||
b. A central core of hypotheses, less central auxiliary assumptions, and problem-solving machinery | ||
c. A collection of tools and methods for solving problems | ||
d. A collection of aims and objectives, a set of procedures for proper data collection and analysis, and a collection of scientific hypotheses and observations |
a. Empirical data cannot settle theoretical controversies. | ||
b. Theoretical controversies sometimes give way to scientific consensus. | ||
c. Different paradigms have different aims and objectives. | ||
d. Empirical data cannot confirm theoretical hypotheses. |
a. Empirical data cannot settle theoretical controversies. | ||
b. Theoretical controversies sometimes give way to scientific consensus. | ||
c. Different paradigms have different aims and objectives. | ||
d. Empirical data cannot confirm theoretical hypotheses. |
a. Karl Popper | ||
b. Thomas Kuhn | ||
c. Imre Lakatos | ||
d. Larry Laudan |
a. Karl Popper | ||
b. Thomas Kuhn | ||
c. Imre Lakatos | ||
d. Larry Laudan |
a. Karl Popper | ||
b. Thomas Kuhn | ||
c. Imre Lakatos | ||
d. Larry Laudan |
a. our current best scientific theories are merely useful instruments for making predictions and controlling the environment. | ||
b. our current best scientific theories are about human-constructed facts. | ||
c. our current best scientific theories are approximately true. | ||
d. our current best scientific theories are empirically adequate. |
a. we should believe that the notion of an "electron" is a useful device for making correct predictions. | ||
b. we should believe that the notion of an "electron" refers to something that is real and composed of quarks and gluons. | ||
c. we should believe that the notion of an "electron" refers to something that is real, but abstain from any belief about whether electrons are made of quarks and gluons. | ||
d. we should believe that the scientific theories about electrons are approximately true. |
a. we should believe that our current best scientific theories are true. | ||
b. we should believe only that the objects postulated by our current best scientific theories are real. | ||
c. we should believe only that the relations between objects postulated by our current best scientific theories are correct. | ||
d. we should believe that the logic used by our current best scientific theories is valid. |
a. our current best scientific theories are merely useful instruments for making predictions and controlling the environment. | ||
b. our current best scientific theories are about human-constructed facts. | ||
c. our current best scientific theories are approximately true. | ||
d. our current best scientific theories are empirically adequate. |
a. we should believe that our current best scientific theories are true. | ||
b. we should believe that the entities postulated by our current best scientific theories are real. | ||
c. we should believe that the relations between entities postulated by our current best scientific theories are correct. | ||
d. we should believe that the logic used by our current best scientific theories is valid. |
a. the approximate truth of our best scientific theories is the best explanation for the success of our best scientific theories. | ||
b. the success of our best scientific theories is the best explanation for the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. | ||
c. the explanatory power of our best scientific theories is the best explanation for the success of our best scientific theories. | ||
d. the approximate truth of our best scientific theories is the best explanation for the empirical adequacy of our best scientific theories. |
a. Copernicus' hypothesis did not predict the location of the planets with as much precision as Johannes Kepler's later, competing hypothesis. | ||
b. Copernicus' hypothesis did not predict the location of heavenly bodies outside the solar system. | ||
c. the competing hypothesis of an Earth-centered universe with a moving sun explained the same observed locations, and changes of location, of the planets. | ||
d. the Catholic Church interpreted the Bible as claiming that there is an Earth-centered universe with a moving sun. |
a. super-strings are fictions useful for the purposes of making correct predictions. | ||
b. the term "super-string" is a useful placeholder for something scientists might discover in the future. | ||
c. super-strings are conceptual constructions that help scientists organize their experiences. | ||
d. super-strings are real. |
a. the equation that characterizes wavefunctions is a useful calculating device. | ||
b. the notion of a wavefunction is a useful fiction. | ||
c. the equation that characterizes wavefunctions is true. | ||
d. the notion of a wavefunction refers to something real. |
a. Since every theory in the history of chemistry has turned out to be false, we have no way to know whether our current best chemical theory is true or false. | ||
b. Since every theory in the history of chemistry has turned out to be false, our current best chemical theory is probably false. | ||
c. Since every theory in the history of chemistry has turned out to be false, we should stop devoting resources to the study of chemistry. | ||
d. Since every theory in the history of chemistry has turned out to be false, every theory in the history of every other scientific discipline is probably false. |
a. Since most of our past scientific theories were false, it is likely that our current scientific theories are true. | ||
b. Since our current scientific theories are about human-constructed facts, it is likely that our current scientific theories are true. | ||
c. Since our current scientific theories are supported by a wide variety of experiments, it is likely that our current scientific theories are true. | ||
d. Since our current scientific theories are approved by the Catholic Church, it is likely that our current scientific theories are true. |
a. Since the success of scientific theories is not surprising, there is no need to explain the success of scientific theories. | ||
b. Since there is no way to assess how often theories are approximately true, the success of a scientific theory does not indicate that the theory is approximately true. | ||
c. Since there is disagreement about which theories are approximately true, the success of a scientific theory does not indicate that the theory is approximately true. | ||
d. Since, by definitions, miracles are unexplainable, there is no need to explain the miraculous success of scientific theories. |
a. New theories tend to retain hypotheses about the objects postulated by older theories. | ||
b. New theories tend to retain hypotheses about relations between objects postulated by older theories. | ||
c. New theories tend to use the same logical rules as older theories. | ||
d. New theories tend to have simpler theoretical structures than older theories. |
a. Some scientists detect dense bodies in red blood platelets using techniques of light microscopy, and other scientists (from a different laboratory) detect dense bodies in red blood platelets using techniques of transmission electron microscopy. | ||
b. Some scientists detect dense bodies in red blood platelets using techniques of light microscopy, and these same scientists detect dense bodies in red blood platelets one month later using the same techniques of light microscopy. | ||
c. Some scientists detect dense bodies in red blood platelets using techniques of light microscopy, and other scientists (from a different laboratory) detect dense bodies in red blood platelets using the same techniques of light microscopy. | ||
d. Some scientists detect dense bodies in red blood platelets using techniques of light microscopy, and other scientists (from a different laboratory) use such detections to confirm a theory about dense bodies in red blood platelets. |
a. Because it was possible that Copernicus' theory was false | ||
b. Because Copernicus' theory had not been approved by the Catholic Church | ||
c. Because Copernicus' theory could not explain the variation in the brightness of Venus | ||
d. Because Osiander was primarily a religious person, and only secondarily a scientist |
a. Science investigates a world that is external to and independent of the mind. | ||
b. Scientific claims about the world refer to real, mind-independent entities, forces, and relations. | ||
c. Our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of a mind-independent world. | ||
d. Scientific investigation of the world is entirely value-free. |
a. There are different gender expectations for young girls as compared to young boys. | ||
b. Academic advisors tend to stereotype women as less capable than their male peers and as uncompetitive. | ||
c. Contributions by men to collaborative research tend to be credited, but contributions by women to collaborative research tend to be ignored. | ||
d. Women are naturally disposed to value cooperation and emotional reasoning, while men are naturally disposed to value competition and analytical reasoning. |
a. Scientists and laypeople do not mean the same thing by the term "theory." | ||
b. Journalists insist on presenting two sides of every controversy, even when scientific inquiry overwhelmingly favors one side. | ||
c. Scientific knowledge often provides only probabilities, but there is a public demand for certainty. | ||
d. Scientific knowledge does not incorporate the values and opinions of religious leaders. |
a. When there are no more dissenting voices | ||
b. When there is a strong general consensus among most scientists | ||
c. When there is no more money to fund new research | ||
d. When one side of the debate proves that the other side is mistaken |
a. Scientific knowledge is proven to be true. | ||
b. Politicians use scientific knowledge in their decision-making processes. | ||
c. Scientific knowledge permeates into the public discourse and becomes a guide to action. | ||
d. Only a select group of people have access to resources for producing and investigating new claims for scientific knowledge. |
a. they involve very formal control of research and high standardization of reporting. | ||
b. they involve standardized rules and methods for researching different problems. | ||
c. they separate a dominant and uniform theory from diverse empirical applications. | ||
d. they involve highly specialized tasks and methods but no uniformity with respect to research goals. |
a. To discover truths about the world | ||
b. To develop theories that are testable and falsifiable | ||
c. To produce work that is cited and read by a large number of other scientists | ||
d. To develop technologies that make the world a better place |
a. diffuse discursive knowledge of commonsense objects. | ||
b. specific, theoretically oriented knowledge. | ||
c. specific, empirical knowledge. | ||
d. specific, theoretically coordinated knowledge. |
a. diffuse discursive knowledge of commonsense objects. | ||
b. specific, theoretically oriented knowledge. | ||
c. specific, empirical knowledge. | ||
d. specific, theoretically coordinated knowledge. |
a. high functional dependence and high strategic dependence. | ||
b. high functional dependence and low strategic dependence. | ||
c. low functional dependence and high strategic dependence. | ||
d. low functional dependence and low strategic dependence. |
a. high strategic task uncertainty and high technical task uncertainty. | ||
b. high strategic task uncertainty and low technical task uncertainty. | ||
c. low strategic task uncertainty and high technical task uncertainty. | ||
d. low strategic task uncertainty and low technical task uncertainty. |
a. high strategic task uncertainty and high technical task uncertainty. | ||
b. high strategic task uncertainty and low technical task uncertainty. | ||
c. low strategic task uncertainty and high technical task uncertainty. | ||
d. low strategic task uncertainty and low technical task uncertainty. |
a. Incorporating values into science would offer additional sources of evidence for supporting some theories over their competitors. | ||
b. Incorporating values into science would provide additional, non-evidential reasons for choosing among theories. | ||
c. Incorporating values into science would show that the process of accepting some theories over their competitors is arbitrary. | ||
d. Incorporating values into science would show that competing scientific theories should be interpreted as mere instruments for prediction and control rather than as candidates for literally true descriptions of the world. |
a. the extent to which scientists must use the research methods and results of their peers in order to conduct competent and useful research. | ||
b. the extent to which scientists must persuade their peers of the importance of their own research in order to gain a high reputation. | ||
c. the extent to which there are sources of employment in the private sector. | ||
d. the extent to which other scientists control scientific communication in the form of journals, conferences, and so on. |
a. the extent to which scientists must use the research methods and results of their peers in order to conduct competent and useful research. | ||
b. the extent to which scientists must persuade their peers of the importance of their own research in order to gain a high reputation. | ||
c. the extent to which there are sources of employment in the private sector. | ||
d. the extent to which other scientists control scientific communication in the form of journals, conferences, and so on. |
a. the intensity of competition among scientists and the number of research centers. | ||
b. the degree to which research techniques are understood and productive of consistent outcomes. | ||
c. the number of available private sector jobs. | ||
d. the cost and distribution of the means of intellectual production and dissemination, and the uncertainty around the hierarchy within the discipline. |
a. the intensity of competition among scientists and the number of research centers. | ||
b. the degree to which research techniques are understood and productive of consistent outcomes. | ||
c. the number of available private sector jobs. | ||
d. the cost and distribution of the means of intellectual production and dissemination, and the uncertainty around the hierarchy within the discipline. |
a. There are diffuse but persistent differences in the recognition of and response to scientific contributions by women. | ||
b. There are systematic differences between men and women scientists with respect to salary, merit raises, institutional responses to external job offers, internal support for research, and allocations of office and laboratory space. | ||
c. The sciences are an inherently masculine domain. | ||
d. Women in academia continue to be concentrated the most insecure positions and the lowest ranks of the academic hierarchy. |
a. Women in science face persistent patterns of underestimation and marginalization. | ||
b. Women lack the drive and commitment to succeed in science. | ||
c. Administrators tend to direct women toward teaching and advising duties, and away from positions that carry institutional power. | ||
d. People tend to attribute the accomplishments of women scientists to luck or other external factors, rather than to talent, training, and hard work. |
a. Gender equity in science allows us to make optimal use of its scientific and engineering talent. | ||
b. Gender equity in science respects the principle that men and women should have equal opportunities to serve society and work in rewarding jobs. | ||
c. Gender equity in science compensates for centuries of male privilege and patriarchal dominance. | ||
d. Gender equity in science prevents economic losses from highly educated women leaving science and engineering professions. |
a. Being value-neutral allows acceptance of theories to be impartial rather than wish-fulfilling. | ||
b. Being value-neutral means that whether a theory is confirmed or well-supported by evidence is not different in different communities or cultures. | ||
c. Being value-neutral means that a theory is probably approximately true. | ||
d. Being value-neutral inhibits acceptance of theories that favor some communities or cultures over others. |