In the modern publicly held corporation, ownership and control are separated. The shareholders “own” the company through their ownership of its stock, but power to manage is vested in the directors. In a large publicly traded corporation, most of the ownership of the corporation is diluted across its numerous shareholders, many of whom have no involvement with the corporation other than through their stock ownership. On the other hand, the issue of separation and control is generally irrelevant to the closely held corporation, since in many instances the shareholders are the same people who manage and work for the corporation.
Shareholders do retain some degree of control. For example, they elect the directors, although only a small fraction of shareholders control the outcome of most elections because of the diffusion of ownership and modern proxy rules; proxy fights are extremely difficult for insurgents to win. Shareholders also may adopt, amend, and repeal the corporation’s bylaws; they may adopt resolutions ratifying or refusing to ratify certain actions of the directors. And they must vote on certain extraordinary matters, such as whether to amend the articles of incorporation, merge, or liquidate.
In most states, the corporation must hold at least one meeting of shareholders each year. The board of directors or shareholders representing at least 10 percent of the stock may call a special shareholders’ meeting at any time unless a different threshold number is stated in the articles or bylaws. Timely notice is required: not more than sixty days nor less than ten days before the meeting, under Section 7.05 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA). Shareholders may take actions without a meeting if every shareholder entitled to vote consents in writing to the action to be taken. This option is obviously useful to the closely held corporation but not to the giant publicly held companies.
Through its bylaws or by resolution of the board of directors, a corporation can set a “record date.” Only the shareholders listed on the corporate records on that date receive notice of the next shareholders’ meeting and have the right to vote. Every share is entitled to one vote unless the articles of incorporation state otherwise.
The one-share, one-vote principle, commonly called regular votingThe principle of one share, one vote. Also called statutory voting. or statutory voting, is not required, and many US companies have restructured their voting rights in an effort to repel corporate raiders. For instance, a company might decide to issue both voting and nonvoting shares (as we discussed in Chapter 45 "Corporate Powers and Management"), with the voting shares going to insiders who thereby control the corporation. In response to these new corporate structures, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a one-share, one-vote rule in 1988 that was designed to protect a shareholder’s right to vote. In 1990, however, a federal appeals court overturned the SEC rule on the grounds that voting rights are governed by state law rather than by federal law.Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
When the articles of incorporation are silent, a shareholder quorumMinimum number of shareholders needed to have a valid vote. Also, when a simple majority of the shares entitled to vote is sufficient to effectuate a meeting. is a simple majority of the shares entitled to vote, whether represented in person or by proxy, according to RMBCA Section 7.25. Thus if there are 1 million shares, 500,001 must be represented at the shareholder meeting. A simple majority of those represented shares is sufficient to carry any motion, so 250,001 shares are enough to decide upon a matter other than the election of directors (governed by RMBCA, Section 7.28). The articles of incorporation may decree a different quorum but not less than one-third of the total shares entitled to vote.
Cumulative votingShareholder voting method permitting the holder to distribute his total votes in any manner that he chooses—all for one candidate or several shares for different candidates. means that a shareholder may distribute his total votes in any manner that he chooses—all for one candidate or several shares for different candidates. With cumulative voting, each shareholder has a total number of votes equal to the number of shares he owns multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. Thus if a shareholder has 1,000 shares and there are five directors to be elected, the shareholder has 5,000 votes, and he may vote those shares in a manner he desires (all for one director, or 2,500 each for two directors, etc.). Some states permit this right unless the articles of incorporation deny it. Other states deny it unless the articles of incorporation permit it. Several states have constitutional provisions requiring cumulative voting for corporate directors.
Cumulative voting is meant to provide minority shareholders with representation on the board. Assume that Bob and Carol each owns 2,000 shares, which they have decided to vote as a block, and Ted owns 6,000 shares. At their annual shareholder meeting, they are to elect five directors. Without cumulative voting, Ted’s slate of directors would win: under statutory voting, each share represents one vote available for each director position. With this method, by placing as many votes as possible for each director, Ted could cast 6,000 votes for each of his desired directors. Thus each of Ted’s directors would receive 6,000 votes, while each of Bob and Carol’s directors would receive only 4,000. Under cumulative voting, however, each shareholder has as many votes as there are directors to be elected. Hence with cumulative voting Bob and Carol could strategically distribute their 20,000 votes (4,000 votes multiplied by five directors) among the candidates to ensure representation on the board. By placing 10,000 votes each on two of their candidates, they would be guaranteed two positions on the board. (The candidates from the two slates are not matched against each other on a one-to-one basis; instead, the five candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.) Various formulas and computer programs are available to determine how votes should be allocated, but the principle underlying the calculations is this: cumulative voting is democratic in that it allows the shareholders who own 40 percent of the stock—Bob and Carol—to elect 40 percent of the board.
RMBCA Section 8.08 provides a safeguard against attempts to remove directors. Ordinarily, a director may be removed by a majority vote of the shareholders. Cumulative voting will not aid a given single director whose ouster is being sought because the majority obviously can win on a straight vote. So Section 8.08 provides, “If cumulative voting is authorized, a director may not be removed if the number of votes sufficient to elect him under cumulative voting is voted against his removal.”
Shareholders use three types of arrangements to concentrate their power: proxies, voting agreements, and voting trusts.
A proxyA method whereby a shareholder elects a representative, commonly another individual or a written document, through which the shareholder casts his vote at the annual meeting. is the representative of the shareholder. A proxy may be a person who stands in for the shareholder or may be a written instrument by which the shareholder casts her votes before the shareholder meeting. Modern proxy voting allows shareholders to vote electronically through the Internet, such as at http://www.proxyvoting.com. Proxies are usually solicited by and given to management, either to vote for proposals or people named in the proxy or to vote however the proxy holder wishes. Through the proxy device, management of large companies can maintain control over the election of directors. Proxies must be signed by the shareholder and are valid for eleven months from the time they are received by the corporation unless the proxy explicitly states otherwise. Management may use reasonable corporate funds to solicit proxies if corporate policy issues are involved, but misrepresentations in the solicitation can lead a court to nullify the proxies and to deny reimbursement for the solicitation cost. Only the last proxy given by a particular shareholder can be counted.
Proxy solicitations are regulated by the SEC. For instance, SEC rules require companies subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to file proxy materials with the SEC at least ten days before proxies are mailed to shareholders. Proxy statements must disclose all material facts, and companies must use a proxy form on which shareholders can indicate whether they approve or disapprove of the proposals.
Dissident groups opposed to management’s position are entitled to solicit their own proxies at their own expense. The company must either furnish the dissidents with a list of all shareholders and addresses or mail the proxies at corporate expense. Since management usually prefers to keep the shareholder list private, dissidents can frequently count on the corporation to foot the mailing bill.
Unless they intend to commit fraud on a minority of stockholders, shareholders may agree in advance to vote in specific ways. Such a voting agreementAn agreement made in advance among shareholders to vote in a particular manner. Also called shareholder agreement., often called a shareholder agreement, is generally legal. Shareholders may agree in advance, for example, to vote for specific directors; they can even agree to vote for the dissolution of the corporation in the event that a predetermined contingency occurs. A voting agreement is easier to enter into than a voting trust (discussed next) and can be less expensive, since a trustee is not paid to administer a voting agreement. A voting agreement also permits shareholders to retain their shares rather than turning the shares over to a trust, as would be required in a voting trust.
To ensure that shareholder agreements will be honored, shareholders in most states can create a voting trustA trust created among shareholders where the shareholders elect a trust agreement, the provisions of which are effectuated by a voting trustee.. By this device, voting shares are given to voting trustees, who are empowered to vote the shares in accordance with the objectives set out in the trust agreement. Section 7.30 of the RMBCA limits the duration of voting trusts to ten years. The voting trust is normally irrevocable, and the shareholders’ stock certificates are physically transferred to the voting trustees for the duration of the trust. The voting trust agreement must be on file at the corporation, open for inspection by any shareholder.
Shareholders are legally entitled to inspect the records of the corporation in which they hold shares. These records include the articles of incorporation, bylaws, and corporate resolutions. As a general rule, shareholders who want certain records (such as minutes of a board of directors’ meeting or accounting records) must also have a “proper purpose,” such as to determine the propriety of the company’s dividend policy or to ascertain the company’s true financial worth. Improper purposes include uncovering trade secrets for sale to a competitor or compiling mailing lists for personal business purposes. A shareholder’s motivation is an important factor in determining whether the purpose is proper, as the courts attempt to balance the rights of both the shareholders and the corporation. For example, a Minnesota court applied Delaware law in finding that a shareholder’s request to view the corporation’s shareholder ledger to identify shareholders and communicate with them about the corporation’s involvement in the Vietnam War was improper. A desire to communicate with the other corporate shareholders was found to be insufficient to compel inspection.Pillsbury v. Honeywell, 291 Minn. 322; 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971). Contrast that finding with a Delaware court’s finding that a shareholder had a proper purpose in requesting a corporation’s shareholder list in order to communicate with them about the economic risks of the firm’s involvement in Angola.The Conservative Caucus Research, Analysis & Education Foundation, Inc. v. Chevron, 525 A.2d 569 (Del. 1987). See Del. Code Ann., Title 8, Section 220 (2011).
Assume that BCT Bookstore has outstanding 5,000 shares with par value of ten dollars and that Carol owns 1,000. At the annual meeting, the shareholders decide to issue an additional 1,000 shares at par and to sell them to Alice. Carol vehemently objects because her percentage of ownership will decline. She goes to court seeking an injunction against the sale or an order permitting her to purchase 200 of the shares (she currently has 20 percent of the total). How should the court rule?
The answer depends on the statutory provision dealing with preemptive rightsThe rights of shareholders to protect dilution of their percentage of share ownership.—that is, the right of a shareholder to be protected from dilution of her percentage of ownership. In some states, shareholders have no preemptive rights unless expressly declared in the articles of incorporation, while other states give shareholders preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation deny it. Preemptive rights were once strongly favored, but they are increasingly disappearing, especially in large publicly held companies where ownership is already highly diluted.
Suppose Carol discovers that Ted has been receiving kickbacks from publishers and has been splitting the proceeds with Bob. When at a directors’ meeting, Carol demands that the corporation file suit to recover the sums they pocketed, but Bob and Ted outvote her. Carol has another remedy. She can file a derivative actionLawsuit brought on behalf of the corporation by a shareholder when the directors refuse to act. against them. A derivative lawsuit is one brought on behalf of the corporation by a shareholder when the directors refuse to act. Although the corporation is named as a defendant in the suit, the corporation itself is the so-called real party in interest—the party entitled to recover if the plaintiff wins.
While derivative actions are subject to abuse by plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking settlements that pay their fees, safeguards have been built into the law. At least ninety days before starting a derivative action, for instance, shareholders must demand in writing that the corporation take action. Shareholders may not commence derivative actions unless they were shareholders at the time of the wrongful act. Derivative actions may be dismissed if disinterested directors decide that the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. (A disinterested directorA director who has no interest in the disputed transaction. is a director who has no interest in the disputed transaction.) Derivative actions are discussed further in Chapter 45 "Corporate Powers and Management".
In large publicly traded corporations, shareholders own the corporation but have limited power to affect decisions. The board of directors and officers exercise much of the power. Shareholders exercise their power at meetings, typically through voting for directors. Statutes, bylaws, and the articles of incorporation determine how voting occurs—such as whether a quorum is sufficient to hold a meeting or whether voting is cumulative. Shareholders need not be present at a meeting—they may use a proxy to cast their votes or set up voting trusts or voting agreements. Shareholders may view corporate documents with proper demand and a proper purpose. Some corporations permit shareholders preemptive rights—the ability to purchase additional shares to ensure that the ownership percentage is not diluted. A shareholder may also file suit on behalf of the corporation—a legal proceeding called a derivative action.
